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Core Issues in the Economics of Biodiversity Conservation 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Critically reviews the following core issues in the economics of biodiversity 
conservation: reliance on the stated preferences of individuals as a guide to 
biodiversity conservation, the relevance of the phylogenetic similarity principle (and 
other attributes of organisms) for the survival of species; the implications of the 
Noah’s ark problem for selecting features of biodiversity to be saved and the 
difficulties raised by criteria based on safe minimum populations of species or on 
minimum environmental standards; the extent to which the precautionary principle 
can be rationally used to support the conservation of biodiversity; the impact of 
market extensions and globalization, as well as market and other institutional failures, 
on biodiversity loss; the relationship between the rate of interest and biodiversity loss; 
and the implications of intergenerational equity for biodiversity conservation. The 
consequences of changes in biodiversity for sustainable development are given 
particular attention. 
 
Keywords:  biodiversity conservation; economic valuation; intergenerational equity; 
phylogenetic similarity principle; precautionary principle; sustainable development. 
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Core Issues in the Economics of Biodiversity Conservation 
 
1. Introduction 
How to determine what set of genetically diverse organisms should be conserved is 
one of the most challenging issues of our time. However, it needs to be analyzed as 
part of a broader problem. Given that collections of organisms (for example, species, 
subspecies and varieties of these) can be retained, added to and subtracted from (often 
as a result of human activities, including genetic engineering)1, 2, the broader problem 
is to determine the optimal time-path that genetic diversity should follow given the 
controlled variables available to humankind. If this problem cannot be solved, (as is 
probable given the bounded rationality of human beings3) it may still be possible to 
avoid biodiversity paths that are demonstrably inferior to alternative paths given 
agreed criteria for choice of biodiversity. The presence of bounded rationality does 
not render it impossible to make any rational decisions but it limits the scope for 
optimization. 
Important issues for biodiversity conservation (a term which should really be 
interpreted in the wider manner identified above) include the impact of human 
institutions, such as market systems, on biodiversity conservation and the 
consequences of human desires for the conservation of ecological alternatives. The 
following matters will be discussed in turn in this article: the valuation of biodiversity 
conservation, market and institutional failures particularly in relation to agricultural 
biodiversity, implications of the rate of interest for biodiversity conservation and 
issues raised by intergenerational equity. Given the restricted space available, only 
limited coverage of this topic is possible. The breadth of this subject can be gauged 
from a recent book edited by Kontoleon, Pascual and Swanson entitled Biodiversity 
Economics: Principles, Methods and Applications4. Although this book is 664 pages 
in length, it by no means exhausts the coverage of this subject. 
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2. The Valuation of Biodiversity 
How to appropriately value biodiversity is a major problem. In particular, we need to 
consider how much weight should be given to citizens’ sovereignty in valuing 
biodiversity. Traditionally, economists have placed a heavy weight on the preferences 
of individuals in determining social choices about resource alternatives. However, a 
number of considerations make this approach to determining a socially optimal path 
for biodiversity problematic. For example, social values alter with the passage of time 
and they both shape and are shaped by individual values. Passmore5 shows how 
Western ethical attitudes to nature have changed and Myrdal6 stressed the importance 
of circular causation in relation to the formation of social values. Furthermore, 
attitudes towards nature often differ between cultures and they also reflect variations 
in cosmological views. In addition, social values probably alter with changes in 
objective circumstances; for example, the view that humans have a duty to conserve 
all living things may have strengthened because biodiversity loss has increased and 
has become more apparent. 
Even if it is accepted that the preferences of all citizens about biodiversity should 
count, the problem remains of how to derive an acceptable social ordering from these, 
as was illustrated by Arrow’s Social Impossibility Theorem 7. There are also many 
problems in eliciting individual preferences for the conservation of biodiversity, not 
least of which are the knowledge constraints that individuals have about alternative 
possible states of biodiversity. While one would like individuals to express their 
preferences in a situation in which they are fully informed, at best, they can only be 
partially informed because of their limited capacities for comprehending, storing and 
processing information 8, 9. 
The supply of information to individuals about species or natural systems to be 
evaluated usually causes their stated preferences for supporting the survival or 
conservation of those species or systems to alter10, 11. In addition, sensual experiences 
can alter stated preferences for the conservation of a particular species12. But the 
stated preferences elicited from individuals are unlikely to remain constant. If the 
initial stimuli are not reinforced, their impact on valuation weakens so that for 
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example, willingness to pay for the survival of a species (or accept compensation for 
its loss) falls, even though no material changes occur other than the passing of time13. 
A Heisenberg-like13 effect creates difficulties for eliciting from individuals their 
valuation of species and similar natural things. This is an additional problem to many 
others that have been encountered in using stated preference methods for evaluating 
environmental and ecological possibilities14. These difficulties include substantial 
differences in the amounts which individuals are willing to pay for retention of 
ecological possibilities and the amount they are willing to accept for the loss of this 
same set of ecological possibilities15, 16. In cases where there is a substantial difference 
between these two measures of valuation, it is necessary to make a moral judgment 
about which is the most appropriate criterion. 
The question also should be considered of whether a deontological approach to 
valuing ecological alternatives is preferable to a utilitarian-type approach17. These 
approaches are sometimes irreconcilable – for example, those with strong ecocentric 
values may refuse to accept social choices supported by those with strong 
anthropocentric utilitarian values. However, some individuals (probably most) may 
accept a combination of these values, for instance, man-centered utilitarian valuations 
may be accepted subject to the fulfillment of various ‘moral imperatives’ about the 
treatment of nature.  
3. The Noah’s Ark Problem 
The Noah’s Ark problem can be used to illustrate several important social choice 
issues in biodiversity conservation, especially if it is combined with the assumption 
that the ark has limited capacity and therefore, only some species can be saved and the 
remainder must perish. This problem focuses attention on the need to decide on the 
ecological alternative to be conserved and to determine the other alternatives that 
muse be forgone. 
It has been contended by some social scientists18, 19, that if human preferences are 
used to determine which species will be saved, preference will be given to saving 
species that show greater similarity in appearance to human beings than others or 
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which have similar biological characteristics to humans. Thus, species of mammals 
are likely to be preferred to bird species, bird species are preferred to reptile species 
and so on. Tisdell et al.20 found empirical support for the similarity principle based on 
whether or not a sample of respondents favored the survival of each species in a group 
of 24 Australian species of mammals, birds and reptiles. However, it was also found 
that amongst the set of reptiles, turtle species were so highly liked and supported for 
survival that the similarity principle was not fully satisfied. A dichotomy existed in 
the likeability of different reptile species and in public’s support for their survival. 
The above-mentioned type of research aims to determine how individuals evaluate 
different species based on the characteristics of the species. However, the humanoid 
similarity of species is not the only attribute influencing such evaluation. For example, 
Metrick and Weitzman21, 22 found that the size of the adults of a species and their 
perceived danger to humans (visceral factors) are also influences on the likeability of 
species. 
This raises the question once again of the extent to which individual preferences of 
this nature should be respected in social decision-making. Deontologists with an 
ecocentric bent would most likely not accept social decision-making based solely on 
individual preferences as a guide to biodiversity conservation because it fails to give 
due weight to moral imperatives such as humankind’s duty to steward nature. In 
reality, mixed ethical systems seem to exist in many societies. For example, individual 
preferences may be respected in social decision-making provided that they do not 
conflict with basic moral principles encapsulated in social values.  
Apart from this moral perspective, respect for individual preferences as a basis for 
decisions about biodiversity conservation needs to be tempered by the extent to which 
individuals are rational and well-informed about alternative ecological possibilities 
and their consequences. 
Although formulations of the Noah’s Ark problem are far from perfect in capturing 
the basic biodiversity choices facing humankind, they highlight the need for trade-offs 
in the survival of species (the likelihood that some can continue to exist but not 
others) or in sustaining other features of biodiversity. Many economic studies 
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intended to estimate the contingent valuation of individual species or selected features 
of biodiversity fail to take adequate account of such trade-offs. Furthermore, it should 
be noted that willingness of individuals to contribute to or pay for the conservation of 
a particular species or a natural ecosystem usually differs from their willingness to 
support its survival11. This is because the willingness of individuals to contribute to 
the conservation of a species (or some other feature of the natural world) partly 
depends on the extent to which its existence is threatened. For example, Tisdell et al.11 
found strong support in Australia for the survival of the red kangaroo but a reluctance 
to contribute funds for its conservation, because it is abundant and not endangered.  
An advantage of considering the constrained Noah’s Ark problem is that it 
demonstrates the limitations of some suggested decision-making criteria for 
determining the conservation of biodiversity. In particular, Ciriacy-Wantrup’s 
suggestion23 that all species be conserved at a safe minimum population may be 
unable to be satisfied because the limited availability of resources makes this 
impossible24. Furthermore, Bishop’s qualification25 that this should be so for each 
species unless the cost of achieving it is unacceptably high for some, begs the 
question of what is ‘unacceptably high’. Again, no completely safe minimum 
population may exist for any species26. 
If the net social value of all components of biodiversity can be expressed in monetary 
terms, then in principle, it would be possible to determine the ecological states that 
would maximize the net social value of biodiversity. Apart, however, from the 
question of whether an acceptable measure of this type could be obtained, the 
estimated values are bound to be uncertain. It is even doubtful whether acceptable 
probabilities could be assigned to the likely value of all components of biodiversity. 
But if this could be done, then in principle, the composition of biodiversity that 
maximizes expected net social benefit could be found. However, this would imply 
that a risk-neutral attitude be taken towards biodiversity conservation, and this is 
unlikely to be socially acceptable. 
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4. Uncertainty, the Precautionary Principle and Decisions about Biodiversity 
Conservation 
It is widely accepted that the benefits of conserving individual species and 
components of biological systems are uncertain. It is usually contended that in these 
circumstances, it is wise to be cautious in decision-making and that it is likely to be 
rational to err in favour of conserving biodiversity. This has been dubbed the 
precautionary principle. However, this matter is much more complicated than seems 
to be the case at first sight. For example, a high preference for security can favor 
development and loss of species or ecosystems because the benefits from 
development can be more certain than those from the conservation of particular 
species and ecosystems27. This is partly a reflection of the adage that ‘a bird in the 
hand is worth two in the bush’. The optimal choice does, however, depend on the 
particular structure of the decision problem.  
It has been pointed out that when risk neutrality exists, it may be rational to err in 
favor of the conservation of species or other components of ecological systems if 
there is uncertainty about the benefits to be had by their conservation28, 29. However, 
even when risk neutrality exist, whether this precaution is rational depends on the 
structure of the possible outcome.  
Suppose that the benefits from conserving a species (or some of the components of an 
ecological system) are uncertain but depend on the magnitude of a property (or 
attribute) of it that is yet to be measured. Assume that while the magnitude of this 
property is uncertain now after a specified period of time, it will become certain. Let x 
measure the magnitude of this property and let y be the benefit from it. Assume that 
the benefit, y, is a function of x such that: 
y = ƒ(x) and ƒ′(x) > 0. (1) 
Now, as can be deduced from Theorem 90 of Hardy et al.30, if ƒ(x) is strictly convex 
(for example, if ƒ′′ > 0) then the expected value of y will tend to rise as the value of x 
becomes more uncertain, that is, as its probability distribution becomes more 
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dispersed. If probabilities can be assigned to the probable values of x and its value is 
uncertain, then 
ƒ(E[x]) < E [ƒ(x)] (2) 
In other words, the uncertainty of benefits from conserving the species raises its 
expected benefit compared to a situation in which its benefit is certainly E[x]. On the 
other hand, if the benefit function ƒ(x) is strictly concave, (for example, f′′(x) < 0) the 
opposite is the case – uncertainty does not favor the conservation of the species. In the 
linear case, uncertainty does not alter the expected benefit from conserving a species. 
Note that using the certainty equivalent E[x] will undervalue the expected benefit of 
conserving the species if ƒ(x) is strictly convex and it will overvalue its expected 
value if ƒ(x) is concave. Thus, as discussed by Theil31, the use of certainty equivalents 
in optimization problems can result in sub-optimal decisions. 
The simple example shown in Figure 1 illustrates these relationships. There the curve 
marked ABC represents a strictly convex situation and curve GH represents a strictly 
concave relationship. Suppose that the property (attributes) preserved by the species 
(or other component of biodiversity) will either turn out to be x1 or x3 with a 
probability of 0.5 each. Then E[x] = x2, the mid-point between x1 and x2. In the convex 
case, there is a 0.5 probability of y having a value corresponding to point A or to point 
C. Therefore, the expected value of y is y2 (the value corresponding to the mid-point 
of the chord connecting points A and C) and is in excess of that at point B, namely y1, 
which would be its value if x were equal to E[x] = x2, in which case uncertainty would 
be absent. Similarly, in the concave case depicted by curve FGH and making similar 
assumptions to those in the previous uncertainty cases, the expected value of the 
benefit function to be less than its value when x = E[x]. In this case, the expected 
value of the benefit function is y4, corresponding to point G, if uncertainty prevails but 
is only equal to y3, corresponding to point J, if x = E[x]. Whereas in the convex case, 
uncertainty favors precaution and conservation of a focal species (or another 
component of biodiversity), the opposite is so in the concave case. The linear case 
exhibits neutrality in that regard. 
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A measure of a property of a species or some other component of biodiversity 
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Figure 1.   A simple illustration of situations in which uncertainty about the value 
of a species (or some other component of biodiversity) favors its 
conservation in one case but not in another case. Uncertainty does not 
always favor the conservation of biodiversity even when there is no 
risk aversion. 
 
While the above discussion indicates that the precautionary principle cannot always 
be rationally invoked as an argument in favor of biodiversity conservation, it ignores 
the significance of the intergenerational benefits from biodiversity conservation and 
problems involved in interpersonal comparisons of benefits. Intergenerational equity 
considerations are likely to provide support for biodiversity conservation. This will be 
discussed later. 
5. Market and other Institutional Failures, Market Extensions, Changed 
Production Methods and Globalization. 
Market failures and other institutional failures, the extension of markets, changed 
production methods and globalization have all contributed to biodiversity loss. Much 
has been written about how markets may fail to minimize economic scarcity and add 
to biodiversity loss and also about similar losses caused by political and 
administrative failures. Factors such as environmental externalities, public good 
attributes of ecological systems, uncertainties and shortcomings in property rights 
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regimes are typically given considerable attention in relation to market failures32. 
Much less attention seems to have been given to the extension of markets, changes in 
production methods and increased globalization as forces contributing to biodiversity 
loss. These factors are, however, major contributors to loss of agricultural biodiversity, 
and similar types of losses occur in relation to forests and aquatic systems. The 
mechanisms involved are varied. 
The extension of markets (of which growing economic globalization is one 
manifestation) usually results in greater specialization in economic production as 
predicted by the law of comparative economic advantage33, 34. This may result in 
industries or activities reliant on unique local genetic material disappearing and the 
subsequent loss of the genetic material itself. For example, in Ghana as a result of 
international economic activity, the growing of tree crops, such as cocoa, has 
developed displacing a local breed of cattle. Market extension has also resulted In 
many local varieties of crops and breeds of livestock being replaced by exotic or 
improved varieties or breeds. This process is facilitated by technological and trade 
developments that tend to reduce the extent to which the production of bio-industries 
are tied to locally available resources. For example, Vietnam’s local breeds of pigs 
have been replaced, to a large extent, by exotic strains of pigs. The productivity of the 
improved pig varieties depends on improved husbandry and food with a high 
nutritional value. Much of the food is imported. Consequently, pig production is 
increasingly decoupled from local environmental and resource conditions. 
Modifications of local conditions increases the extent of global uniformity in the 
environmental and resource possibilities faced by bio-industries and results in greater 
uniformity of utilized genetic material. Genetic material well adapted to natural local 
conditions is lost. Human management (facilitated by international trade in 
agricultural inputs) tends to result in increased uniformity in the constructed niches in 
which biologically based production occurs. Consequently, less genetic diversity is 
needed for bio-production than otherwise. However, this loss of genetic diversity is 
not without potential economic costs because it reduces future genetic options that is, 
flexibility in decision-making. 
There are, of course, many factors that influence the extent of agricultural biodiversity 
loss as has been pointed out by Smale and Drucker35 in reviewing relevant economic 
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literature. However, many of the findings in the literature are consistent with the view 
that, on the whole, agricultural biodiversity is reduced by market extension (greater 
access of farmers to markets) and by changes (such as technological changes) which 
reduce the heterogeneity of environmental conditions under which crops grow or in 
which livestock are husbanded. This increased environmental homogeneity is due to 
human manipulation of agro-environments. 
It is also clear that in cases where market extension leads to increased demand for an 
open-access resource (or one for which property-rights regimes are imperfect) that 
other things constant, this will tend to lead to a more rapid depletion of the resource. 
In the case of a living resource, the likelihood of it being extinguished increases. The 
provision of roads and similar infrastructure in remote regions accelerates 
deforestation and consequently, biodiversity loss by increasing market access36. 
However, as pointed out above, such loss may occur even if market failures are absent. 
Nevertheless, when market failures occur in biodiversity conservation, market 
extension (including increased globalization) can be expected to accelerate 
biodiversity loss as suggested by Alam and Van Quyen37. 
Another feature of increased globalization is that it has increased the rate and extent 
of spread of genetic material between regions because humans have increasingly 
facilitated this spread. This spread has sometimes been deliberate and at other times 
accidental. Some of the issues involved are discussed by Perrings38. Often it has had 
negative spillovers and it has been a force making for the reduction of biodiversity 
globally. For example, the introduction of livestock to Australia by European settlers 
has been implicated in the disappearance of some Australian indigenous species. The 
introduction of the cane toad to northern Queensland to control a beetle pest in sugar 
cane has turned out to be a biological disaster because it has spread (and continues to 
do so) and poses a threat to the survival of several Australian native species. 
6. The Rate of Interest and Biodiversity Conservation 
In the economics literature, an increased rate of interest is usually seen as a deterrent 
to the conservation of economic resources. Two main reasons are usually advanced: 
(1) it reduces the discounted present value of benefits to be obtained from delaying 
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the use of the resource, other things constant and (2) it increases the likelihood that 
those owning such resources can increase their returns by realizing the current value 
of the asset and gain by investing the funds in the capital market. Furthermore, 
intergenerational equity suggests that a zero discount of realizable benefits between 
generations would be socially appropriate, as is argued in The Economics of 
Ecosystems and Biodiversity: Interim Report32  and by Ramsey39. It is instructive to 
examine these matters closely.  
Consider the view that a high rate of interest is inimical to biodiversity conservation40. 
Whether or not this is so depends on the particular circumstances. If the steady-state 
economic return from the stock of a unique organism is constant, then once the rate of 
interest rises above this constant level, the incentive to realize the value of the stock of 
the organism tends to increase. This is so if it is assumed that the cost of liquidating 
(realizing) the living asset is constant and that its total realizable value is constant. 
The lower is the cost of harvesting the stock of the organism, the more likely is the 
stock to be extinguished as the rate of interest rises, other things held constant. As the 
rate of interest rises, it becomes more profitable to realize the capital value of the 
standing stock of the unique organism and invest the funds obtained at the going rate 
of interest.  
Another mechanism leading to the extinction of unique organisms in a commercial 
setting is their replacement by organisms that give a higher economic return. For 
example, slow growing and less valuable tree species may be replaced by faster 
growing and more valuable ones. In practice, the replacement species are often exotic 
to the region where they are grown. However, the replacement of the species is not 
without initial costs. Costs can be expected to be incurred in the replacement period 
and income can be expected to be forgone during the gestation period before the 
replacement crop (species) becomes commercially productive. These costs create an 
economic disincentive to switch to the replacement species. Furthermore, the 
replacement disincentive magnifies as the rate of interest rises, other things being held 
constant.  
This can be illustrated by a simplified case. In Figure 2, line ABCD represents the net 
income flow from utilizing a unique species, other things being held constant. 
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Suppose that at time t1 it becomes apparent that this species could be replaced by 
another giving a higher net income flow after the replacement species is established. 
However, initial costs must be incurred to achieve the adjustment and consequently, if 
the replacement is undertaken at t1, the net income path is assumed to become EFGH, 
where t3 is assumed to be the time horizon for this decision problem, If the rate of 
interest is zero (and no discounting occurs), it is profitable to switch to the new 
species if the area of rectangle GCDH exceeds that of BEFC and not to do this if the 
opposite relationship prevails. If both these areas are equal, then either of the 
alternative strategies is equally profitable. However, if in this case, a positive interest 
rate prevails, replacement of the existing species is no longer profitable because the 
discounted value of the income flow in the area of rectangle GCDH will be less than 
that in the area of rectangle BEFC. In general, a higher rate of interest will be a 
deterrent to the replacement of the existing species by another in a situation like this. 
Therefore, in cases like this, a higher rate of interest is a deterrent to biodiversity loss, 
unlike in the previous case. Note also that the longer is the gestation period, t2 – t1, 
and greater is the reduction in income in this period, the lower is the economic 
incentive to replace the existing species by the substitute species. 
Net 
Income 
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Figure 2   An illustration of a case in which a higher rate of interest reduces the 
likelihood of the loss of a commercially utilized species as a 
consequence of its being replaced by another species.  
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The above theory is based on partial microeconomic analysis. Consideration of 
macroeconomic analysis also confirms that there is no simple regular relationship 
between the rate of interest and the likely extent of biodiversity loss41. Investment in 
man-made capital usually involves the transformation or depletion of natural capital 
and is a major source of biodiversity loss. Depending on the macroeconomic 
circumstances, the level of investment in man-made capital can increase or decrease 
when the rate of interest rises41. For example, suppose that in the neoclassical case 
illustrated in Figure 3 the demand for funds for investment is initially as shown by the 
line D1D1 and the supply of these are as indicated by S1S1. Market equilibrium occurs 
at E1 with the rate of interest being r1. The level of investment is equal to X1. If the 
supply curve of savings (loanable funds) shifts up to S2S2 and the demand for 
investible funds remains unchanged, market equilibrium alters from E1 to E2. The rate 
of interest increases from r1 to r2 and the level of investment declines from X1 to X0. 
Given that the level of investment is positively associated with the rate of biodiversity 
loss, the rate of biodiversity loss declines. On the other hand, if the supply curve of 
loanable funds remains unaltered and the demand curve for the funds shifts upwards, 
the rate of interest rises and so does the level of investment. For example if the 
demand curve shifts up to D2D2 market equilibrium alters from E1to E2, the rate of 
interest goes up to r2 and investment increases from X1 to X2. Thus, if increased 
investment in man-made capital poses a heightened threat to biodiversity conservation, 
biodiversity loss tends to rise. Therefore, one cannot judge just from the sign of 
variation in the rate of interest whether there is an increase or decrease in biodiversity 
loss. Similar results hold for IS-LM models. 
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Figure 3.   In a microeconomic setting, a rise in the rate of interest may be 
accompanied by either a rise or fall in the level of investment, as is 
illustrated above. Consequently, if biodiversity loss is positively 
associated with the level of investment, a rise in the rate of interest can 
be associated with an increase or with a fall in the rate of biodiversity 
loss, and vice versa. 
 
In IS-LM models, a rise in the rate of interest can be associated with a rise or a fall in 
the level of investment and GDP and the same is true of a fall in the rate of interest. 
For example, if the LM curve shifts to the left with IS curve unchanged, the rate of 
interest rises and the levels of investment and of GDP fall. Should the IS curve move 
to the right with the LM curve unchanged, once again the rate of interest rises but this 
time, the level of investment and of GDP go up. Similarly, a decrease in the rate of 
interest may be associated with a decline in the levels of investment and of GDP or 
with an increase in these depending on how the change is generated. Thus, if in a 
macroeconomic setting, increases in investment and GDP are associated with a higher 
rate of biodiversity loss (as is likely), there is no regular association between changes 
in the rate of interest and the rate of biodiversity loss. 
There is evidence from the economic literature on behavioral economics that 
individuals do not use a constant rate of discount to estimate the present value of 
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future benefits but use a discount rate that declines in a hyperbolic fashion as a 
function of time42. This means that their present values of distant benefits and costs 
are higher than estimated by the traditional economic method of discounting. Whether 
that will favor greater biodiversity conservation is unclear, but it may do so. However, 
the reasons for hyperbolic discounting by individuals needs more investigation in 
order to determine whether it would be socially rational to adopt a similar procedure 
for social discounting. We must face the possibility that some observed behaviors are 
not rational even though they occur frequently. 
7. Intergenerational Equity and Biodiversity Conservation 
The desirability, or otherwise, of conserving biodiversity has become an integral part 
of the debate about the necessary requirements for achieving sustainable development. 
While human actions reducing biodiversity now may benefit current generations (or 
nearby generations), they may disbenefit generations further into the future. In fact, 
future generations could be impoverished by such actions. Nevertheless, the 
relationship between current biodiversity loss and the welfare of future generations 
remains extremely uncertain and there is lack of agreement on the ethical principles 
that should be adopted to choose between the alternative possible paths of human 
well-being that could prevail. One view about a desirable path of sustainable 
development is that it be such that the welfare of each generation be not less than that 
of its predecessor. However, that is not a requirement of Rawls’ principle of justice 
which is often used to provide an ethical underpinning to the desirability of 
sustainable development43. Rawls claims that equality of income (well-being) of 
individuals is desirable unless inequality is to the benefit of all. Theoretically, it is 
possible that some types of biodiversity loss (or change) could result in all generations 
being better off than without such loss (change) but result in some future generations 
being less well off than their predecessors. For example, the alternative pathways 
shown in Figure 4 may apply if tn is assumed to be the end of the time-horizon. Let 
pathway ABC represent the well-being of successive generations in the absence of 
biodiversity loss and let path ADE be that with some biodiversity loss or change 
induced by human actions. If Rawls’ principle is adopted, path ADE is the most 
desirable alternative because it results in the well-being of every generation being 
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greater than for the alternative path, ABC. This is so even though after t1, each 
successive generation has a lower level of well-being than its predecessor.  
A 
U 
O t1 tn t 
End of time-
horizon 
C 
E 
D 
B 
Measure of 
well-being 
per capita 
Time (successive future generations) 
 
Figure 4.   An illustration of the possibility that some biodiversity loss (change) 
could result in a higher level of well-being for all generations 
compared to no biodiversity loss. This is so, despite the welfare of 
some future generations declining compared to that of their 
predecessors if some biodiversity loss occurs. 
 
It is also conceivable that some biodiversity loss (or change) could result in the 
welfare of some future generations falling below that which could prevail in the 
absence of biodiversity loss or if there is only a slight loss in biodiversity. For 
example, the situation illustrated in Figure 5 is possible. There the path ABC 
represents the path of well-being in the absence of biodiversity loss and curve ADEF 
indicates that when some biodiversity loss or change occurs. In this case, generations 
coming after t2 are worse off when some biodiversity loss or change occurs compared 
to a situation in which there is no biodiversity loss. Therefore, if Rawls’ principle of 
justice is adopted, the path with no biodiversity loss would be preferred to that with 
some biodiversity loss or change. However, it still may be that alternative normative 
criteria to that of Rawls results in path ADEF being chosen as socially superior to 
ABC.  
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U0 
t1 t2 tn t 
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C E 
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B 
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U1 
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Figure 5.   Illustration of a case in which the option of biodiversity loss (or 
change) does not satisfy Rawls’ principle of justice but is socially 
superior for an alternative social norm based on a safety-first principle. 
 
For example, if all individuals could consult prior to their being born and assuming 
similar conditions to Rawls43, they might agree to the adoption of a development path 
that maximizes their expected well-being subject to their well-being not falling below 
an acceptable level44. If the acceptable minimum level of well-being for any 
generation is U0, the development path ADEF corresponding to some biodiversity loss 
or change might satisfy this safety-first rule, as was discussed by Tisdell45.  
In the hypothetical situation envisaged by Rawls43 , the optimal development path 
depends on how yet-to-be-born individuals estimate their probability of being born 
into each possible future generation or of being born at any future point in time. One 
possibility is that they could adopt Laplace’s rule of insufficient reason, namely that 
in the case of completely uncertain events, each possible event should be assumed to 
be equally probable. On this basis, the yet to be born may assume that the probability 
of their being born into any future generation (or at any future point in time) is equal 
for each. In that case, the expected value of the path ADEF to the yet-to-be-born 
would exceed that of path ABC because, from inspection, it can be seen that the area 
of the set bounded by ABED exceeds that of the set bounded by EFC. Therefore, path 
ADEF, which hypothetically involves some biodiversity loss (or change) is socially 
18 
superior to path ABC, which hypothetically involves no biodiversity loss or a minimal 
change in biodiversity. This is so because it maximizes the expected well-being of 
future generations and at the same time, ensures that the well-being of no generation 
falls below an acceptable standard. 
he path ABC, 
which hypothetically occurs if there is no biodiversity loss, is superior. 
r, in the longer term, the 
levels of future human population are extremely uncertain. 
But given the same conditions, if the acceptable level of well-being for every 
generation exceeds U1 but is less than AO, it does not. In that case, t
Although it does not negate the conclusions drawn above, it should be kept in mind 
that the estimation of probabilities based on Laplace’s principle of insufficient reason 
is sensitive to the way in which possible events are envisaged. For example, the yet-
to-be-born may assume that their probability of being born into a future generation is 
equal to the proportion of the future population to be born into that generation. 
Therefore, in this case the expected values of the development paths are sensitive to 
distribution (over time) of the future population. Howeve
Despite the limitations of the above model, it does raise some important policy issues. 
For example, The Economics of Ecosystems and Biodiversity Interim Report32 is 
inconclusive in its recommendations about whether the economic benefits received by 
future generations should be discounted when valuing alternative paths of future 
economic benefit. Nevertheless, on equity grounds, this report appears to favor a zero 
discount rate and even suggests that a negative discount rate might be justifiable (see 
pages 30-31). However, neither is satisfactory because the sum of future benefit or 
well-being values of all who will live, discounted or not, is not a satisfactory indicator 
of the optimality or otherwise of alternative benefit paths. The nature of the paths 
themselves needs to be compared. For example, the intergenerational path ADEF in 
Figure 5 gives a higher value than path ABC when a zero discount rate is applied. 
However, if the minimum acceptable level of benefit (well-being) for any future 
generation must exceed U1 (for example, is OA), then path ABC is preferable to path 
ADEF even though its present undiscounted value is less than that for ADEF. This 
could still be the case if a small enough negative rate of discount were applied. This 
19 
matter was raised by Tisdell27 in relation to the introduction of genetically modified 
organisms. 
The above development models assume perfect knowledge of changes in biodiversity 
and the well-being of humans. Even in these cases, social choice is complicated. 
Uncertainty about these variables adds to this complexity. For example, the 
development and use of genetically modified organisms (GMOs) can alter 
biodiversity in uncertain ways. Furthermore, the development of a GMO or a new 
organism by humans may lead to an expanding but uncertain range of subsequent 
development of organisms by humans, thereby further adding to uncertainty about 
future states of biodiversity. Technological optimists are liable to see these 
developments as a way of continually raising human well-being whereas 
technological pessimists are afraid they will end in biological and economic disaster. 
Irreducible risks and uncertainties exist about the consequences of human 
manipulation of biodiversity. This seems to be an inescapable source of social conflict 
s of individuals to the bearing of risk and uncertainty vary 
considerably. 
 in human preferences for the 
survival of species as indicated for example by the similarity principle. Furthermore, 
because attitude
8. Conclusion 
Several core issues of relevance for social decision-making about biodiversity 
conservation have been outlined. While these issues are substantive, they are not 
exhaustive. Reliance on individual human preferences to determine alternative 
biodiversity choices was shown to have several limitations. For instance, social 
conditioning and knowledge variations influence the attitudes of individuals towards 
the conservation of different organisms and components of biodiversity. While it 
would be comforting to believe that evolution of social values results in more 
enlightened individual preferences and values, we cannot be sure that this is always 
historically the case. There also appear to be ‘biases’
human preferences are sensitive to the provision of information which given the 
bounded rationality of individuals, has to be selective. 
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The presence of uncertainty creates major problems for the evaluation of choices 
about biodiversity conservation. Consequently, it has been suggested that it is rational 
to adopt a precautionary approach to biodiversity loss. However, conservation of 
biodiversity is not always favored by a precautionary approach to decision-making. 
As is well known, market failures of various kinds can contribute to biodiversity loss. 
However, it also appears to be the case that the extension of markets and globalization 
Some economic literature suggests that rises in the rate of interest are likely to hasten 
ces of these developments. For example, the development of one GMO 
may expand options for developing others but these developments may be fairly 
d its impact on other species may remain uncertain. While optimists 
are likely to have a very favorable view of likely outcomes, pessimists (realists?) 
rry man 
welfare
generate processes that play major roles in hastening biodiversity loss, even in the 
absence of market failures. Some of the mechanisms that cause this to happen have 
been identified.  Furthermore, the structure of economic systems globally make it very 
difficult to moderate economic growth that erodes the stock of biodiversity46 
biodiversity loss. While this can happen in particular circumstances, it is by no means 
always true. There is no simple relationship between changes in the level of interest 
and the rate of biodiversity loss, as evidenced both by microeconomic and 
macroeconomic analysis. 
Loss of existing biodiversity tends to reduce the natural capital of society, for example, 
the loss of genetic material in the wild. In the case of biodiversity loss in domesticated 
livestock and cultivated crops, human-created capital is reduced. Both these sources 
of biodiversity loss can threaten sustainable development. Some such losses may 
benefit existing generations but be a disbenefit to future generations. As was 
illustrated, difficult intergenerational equity choices can emerge as a result of this. 
These are compounded by uncertainty about development paths that may emerge from 
alterations in biodiversity. For example, the impact of the development and use of 
GMOs on existing biodiversity is often uncertain and so are the long-run 
consequen
unpredictable an
wo about the possible results and their consequences for biodiversity and hu
.  
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